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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LANCE PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020330-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from an order dismissing the charges against defendant after it had 
earlier refused to bind defendant over for trial on the charge of possession of 
methamphetamine. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-l(2)(a) 
(1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Was the evidence sufficient to bind defendant over for trial for possession of 
methamphetamine where police testified at the preliminary hearing that (1) defendant 
admitted to an officer that he had a quarter gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom, and 
(2) officers found in defendant's bedroom a small baggy containing a white crystal substance 
that field tested positive for methamphetamine (but that the substance was still at the State 
Crime Lab pending conclusive testing)? 
1 
Standard of Review. The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over 
for trial is a question of law reviewed for correctness, without deference to the magistrate. 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300; State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 
1995); see also State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464,466 (Utah 1991) (holding that a district 
court conducts its own review of a bindover order, granting no deference to the magistrate). 
This issue was preserved at the preliminary hearing and the State's motion to reconsider, 
treated as a rule 24 motion. R. 121; R. 56-61, 104. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a 
determination of this case: 
Utah Const art. LS 12 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah CQ& Aim, § ?3-37-8(2)(a) (gupp. 1999) 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly'and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
2 
tltahR Crim.P.70ri 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Based on evidence seized from defendant's vehicle at the Lindon Boat Harbor on the 
night of October 18, 2000, defendant was charged by information with possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone (Count 1), and possession of drug 
paraphernalia within a drug-free zone (Count 3). R. 5-6; R. 121: 7,12-15. The information 
also charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine (Count 2). R. 6. That charge 
was based on evidence seized from defendant's residence later that night. See R. 121:34-36. 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on the marijuana and 
paraphernalia charges. R. 121: 39-41. However, the magistrate refused to bind defendant 
over for trial on the methamphetamine charge because the substance seized from defendant's 
home was still at the State Crime Lab pending conclusive testing. R. 121: 39-41. 
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Two and one-half months later, but prior to the entry of any written order dismissing 
the methamphetamine charge, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court's refusal to 
bind defendant over on the methamphetamine charge. R. 56-61. Treating the motion as a 
motion for new trial and relying on its verbal pronouncement at the preliminary hearing that 
the methamphetamine charge was dismissed, the court denied the State's motion to 
reconsider as untimely. See R. 103-05. The court rejected the State's argument that the 
motion was not untimely because a written order of dismissal had not yet been filed, ruling 
that such an order was not necessary. See R. 104. 
The trial court subsequently granted a defense motion to suppress the evidence seized 
from defendant's vehicle when the State's witness failed to appear at the scheduled 
suppression hearing. R. 124: 9, Thereafter, the court entered an "Order of Dismissal" 
dismissing "the charges as set forth on the Information.'* R. 112- The State timely appealed. 
R. 114. The State challenges only the dismissal of the methamphetamine charge. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS1 
Search of Defendant's Car 
While on patrol at approximately 11:00 p.m. on October 18,2000, Sgt. Richard Taylor 
noticed two people sitting in a vehicle parked at the end of the pier of the Lindon Boat 
Harbor—a public park* R. 121: 7, 19-21. Concerned that the occupants might need 
assistance, Sgt. Taylor drove his car closer, paiked, and walked to the car. R. 121:7-8. He 
^ e State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution and resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). 
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did not activate his overhead emergency lights, nor did he block in the car. See R. 121: 8, 
22. Defendant was seated in the driver's seat and a female companion was seated in the front 
passenger seat. See R. 121: 8-9. Sgt. Taylor greeted defendant and spoke with him for a 
minute. R. 121:9, 23. 
As he spoke with defendant, Sgt. Taylor smelled alcohol and burnt marijuana 
emanating from the vehicle. R. 121:9,23,29-31. At that point, Sgt. Taylor asked defendant 
to produce his driver's license and to exit the car. R. 121:9,23-24. After conducting a pat-
down search of defendant, Sgt. Taylor searched the car, finding a plastic bag containing 
almost 100 grams of compressed, dried marijuana, a set of finger scales, and a box of Zig Zag 
rolling papers. R. 121: 9-10, 12, 15, 23-25. After Sgt. Taylor confiscated the marijuana, 
defendant admitted that the "weed" belonged to him and that he had just purchased it. R. 
121: 16, 26. Sgt. Taylor arrested defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights, which 
defendant waived. R. 121: 16. 
Search of Defendant's Bedroom 
Following defendant's arrest, Sgt. Taylor overheard defendant's female companion 
ask him about his bedroom window. R. 121: 17. She then pulled out a cell phone to make 
a call, but Sgt. Taylor asked her to give it to him before she was able to do so. R. 121: 17. 
Suspecting that illegal drugs may be in defendant's bedroom, Sgt. Taylor sought defendant's 
consent to search his bedroom. R. 121:17-18,27-28,35. Defendant asked if they would let 
him go if he permitted the search. R. 121: 28. Sgt. Taylor told him they could not do that 
under the circumstances. R. 121:28. Nevertheless, defendant agreed to the search. R. 121: 
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17, 27-28. With defendant in the police car, Sgt. Taylor drove to within a block or two of 
defendant's home where he was met by three other officers from the sheriffs office. R. 121: 
18-19,34. Before directing the three officers to proceed with the search, Sgt. Taylor read to 
defendant from the permission to search form, advising him that he had the right to refuse 
the search. R. 121:28. After being so advised, defendant signed a written consent to search 
his bedroom. R. 121:28. 
After defendant signed the written consent, Sgt. Taylor transported him to the jail and 
the other officers remained to conduct the search. R. 121:18-19,30,35-36. During his ride 
to the jail, defendant told Sgt. Taylor that he was 'Very concerned about them finding 
methamphetamine in his bedroom, and he said that all he had was a quarter gram." R. 121? 
19. He also asked Sgt. Taylor "if [he] wouldn't charge him for that because it was such a 
small amount." R. 121: 19. In the meantime, the officers conducting the search of 
defendant's bedroom discovered a small baggy containing a white crystal substance. R. 121: 
35-36. Detective Rob Riding collected the evidence and took it to the police station where 
officers field tested it for drugs. R. 121: 36,38. The substance, weighing 0.6 grams, tested 
positive for methamphetamine. R. 121: 36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate refused to bind defendant over for trial because the State did not 
introduce the methamphetamine into evidence and had not yet received the final results from 
the testing at the State Crime Lab. This was error. Sgt. Taylor testified that defendant 
admitted to him that he had a quarter of a gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom. 
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Detective Riding, a drug recognition expert, testified that he seized from defendant's 
bedroom a baggy containing a white crystal substance that field tested positive for 
methamphetamine. This evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that defendant 
unlawfully possessed methamphetamine. Where, as here, the evidence at a preliminary 
hearing supports a reasonable inference of guilt, the magistrate may not draw other 
inferences in favor of innocence. In doing so here, the magistrate impermissibly elevated the 
probable cause standard. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT DEFENDANT WAS IN 
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
A. THE BINDOVER STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY HEARINGS. 
Purpose of the Preliminary Hearing 
When a crime is charged by information, the Utah Constitution guarantees the accused 
the right to a preliminary hearing. See Utah Const, art. I, § 13; see also State v. Ortega, 751 
P.2d 1138,1139(Utah 1988). "[T]he preliminary hearing is used to determine whether there 
is sufficient cause to believe a crime has been committed to warrant further proceedings." 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d644,646 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 
f 7, 3 P.3d 725, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). Therefore, like a federal grand jury, 
the magistrate at a preliminary hearing "staad[s] between the accuser and the accused" to 
determine whether the charges are "founded upon reason" or are the result of "hasty, 
malicious [or] oppressive persecution." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,390,82 S.Ct. 1364, 
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1373 (1962); see also State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980) (holding that a 
preliminary hearing serves to eliminate "the grave injustice suffered by [a] defendant in an 
unwarranted prosecution"). Stated simply, "[t]he preliminary hearing... acts as a screening 
device to' ferret out... groundless and improvident prosecutions.'" Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 
(quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84) (second ellipsis in original). 
Value of Probable Cause Standard 
To attain this objective, the Utah Constitution provides that the preliminary 
examination be "limited to determining whether probable cause exists." Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12.2 The value of the probable cause standard rests in the "balance [that it strikes] between 
the rights of individual citizens and the interests of the people as a whole in law 
enforcement." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,226 (Utah App. 1995). As observed by the 
United States Supreme Court more than one-half century ago: 
These long-prevailing standards [of probable cause] seek to safeguard 
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from 
unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing 
the law in the community's protection. . . . The rule of probable cause is a 
practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been 
found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more 
would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave 
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of [law enforcement's] whim or caprice. 
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176,69S.Ct 1302,1311 (1949) (emphases added). 
Consistent with this rationale, the preliminary hearing operates "to screen out those [charges] 
2Section 12 indicates that the function of the preliminary hearing is limited to a 
probable cause determination "unless otherwise provided by statute." Utah Const, art. I, 
§12. The legislature has not enacted any statute expanding the scope of the preliminary 
hearing. 
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that are unfounded and to thereby preserve the accused's reputation from public humiliation." 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 527 (Utah 1984). 
Evidentiary Burden for Probable Cause 
Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175,69 S.Ct. at 
1310. On the other hand, the evidence to establish probable cause "need not be capable of 
supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 15, 
20 P.3d 300. Indeed, the evidentiary burden for probable cause "is significantly less than that 
needed to prove guilt.'" State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231,1235 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis 
added). The facts presented at a preliminary hearing do not even have to establish a prima 
case of guilt, as in the case of a directed verdict motion. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at fT 11, 16." 
Rather, the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a bindover is the 
same as that required for an arrest warrant. Id. at f 16. Like the officer seeking an arrest 
warrant, "the prosecution [at a preliminary hearing] must present sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." Id. As noted by the Supreme Court, "the evidence required [to show probable 
cause at this stage of the proceeding]... is relatively low because the assumption is that the 
prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation continues." Evans v. State, 963 
P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998); accord Clark, 2001 UT 9, at flO. 
"The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 1310, 69 S.Ct. at 175 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, "[i]n establishing probable cause, as the term suggests, we 
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deal not in certainties, but in 'probabilities.'" Hartley, 784 P.2dat 1235 (citingBrinegar, 338 
U.S. at 175,69 S.Ct. at 1310).3 The Supreme Court in Brinegar explained that "[t]hese are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is 
accordingly correlative to what must be proved." 338 U.S. at 1310, 69 S.Ct. at 175. Id; 
accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990). Just this month, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that probable cause exists where the "' facts and circumstances . . . are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed... an offense.'" State v. Trane, 2002 
UT 97, J 26, — Utah Adv. Rep. — (arrest case) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.Sf 
31,37,99 S.Ct. 2627,2632 (1979)). In other words, probable cause requires no more than 
a "rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 
1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994). 
As observed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, "probable cause at a preliminary 
hearing is satisfied when there exists a believable or plausible account of the defendant's 
commission of a felony." State v. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d 389,398,359 N.W.2d 151,155 (Wis. 
1984). Therefore, even if an innocent explanation for the defendant's conduct might exist, 
3Because the same quantum of evidence is required for a bindover as that required 
for an arrest, which is the same as that required for a search, see Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 
227, decisions addressing the necessary showing for a search are instructive in the context 
of a preliminary hearing. The Court in Spurgeon held that a distinction is necessarily 
drawn between probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest "because '[e]ach 
requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances."' Id. 
(1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b), at 544 (2d ed. 1987)). 
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"the law does not require that 'all innocent explanations for a person's actions be absent 
before those actions can provide probable cause"1 for bindover. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 
506, 509 (Utah App. 1989) (arrest case) (quoting Wood v. United States, 498 A.2d 1140, 
1144 (D.C. 1985)); accord Poole, 871 P.2d at 535 (search case). The probable cause 
requirement will be satisfied as long there exists a reasonable inference that supports a 
conclusion that the defendant probably committed the crime, even if there are equally strong 
inferences to the contrary. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 20 (holding that an inference of 
legitimate behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct); see also 
Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 395-99, 359 N.W.2d at 154-56. In short, '"unless the evidence is 
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 896 
P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)) (brackets in 
original); accord State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, f 10,44 P.3d 730. 
Role of the Magistrate 
Because the preliminary hearing "is not a trial on the merits, [but] a gateway to the 
finder of fact," the magistrate's role is limited. State v. Talbot, 932 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 
1998). Although the magistrate should not countenance "facially incredible evidence," 
Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438, he or she may not otherwise "'sift or weigh the evidence.'" Hester, 
2000 UT App 159, at f 7 (quoting State v. tells, 1999 UT 27, f 2,977 P.2d 1192); accord 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10. "Instead, 'the magistrate must view all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
11 
prosecution.'" Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10 (quoting Hester, 2000 UT App 159, at ^  7). In 
other words, [i]t is not for the [magistrate] at a preliminary hearing to accept the defendant's 
version of the facts over the legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the [State's] 
evidence." See People v. District Court of Colorado's Seventeenth Judicial District, 803 
P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Deciding 
between inferences and conflicting evidence is left for the jury. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 
10. Accordingly, "[a] magistrate errs when he or she chooses an inference resulting h 
release of a defendant when a reasonable alternative inference" supports the State's case. See 
Statev.Dunn,U7Ws.2d4$7,49\,345N.W.2d6997l (Wis. App.), atfd, 121 Wis.2d389, 
359 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. 1984). In short, the magistrate's sole duty is uto ensure that aft 
'groundless and improvident prosecutions9 are ferreted out" Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 
7,3 P.3d 725 (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84) (emphasis added); accord Clark, 2002 
UT 9, at 110. 
B. THE MAGISTIUTE IMPERMISOT^ 
Applying the legal standards appropriate to a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
should have bound defendant over for trial. To meet the bindover requirement in this case, 
the State was required to present evidence sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that 
defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed methamphetamine. See Clark, 2001 UT 
9, at f 16; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a){Supp. 1999). The evidence introduced at the 
preliminary hearing was more than sufficient. 
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At the preliminary hearing, Sgt. Richard Taylor of the Utah County Sheriffs Office 
testified that after arresting defendant at the Lindon Boat Harbor, he overheard defendant's 
girlfriend say something to him about his bedroom window. R. 121:17. Sgt. Taylor testified 
that based on that conversation, he suspected that "another quantity of controlled substances 
or marijuana5' might be in defendant's bedroom. R. 121: 17. Had this been the only 
testimony related to the methamphetamine charge, the evidence would not have been 
sufficient to support bindover on the methamphetamine charge. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 
175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310 (holding that bare suspicion not enough to establish probable cause). 
It was not the only evidence. 
Sgt. Taylor testified that after overhearing the couple's conversation, he asked for and 
obtained defendant's consent to search his bedroom in Orem. R. 121: 17, 27-28. With 
defendant in his car, Sgt. Taylor drove to within a block or two of defendant's home where 
he met three other officers. R. 121:18-19,34. After obtaining defendant's written consent 
to search and directing the other officers to conduct the search, Sgt. Taylor drove defendant 
to the jail. R. 121: 18-19, 30. Sgt. Taylor testified that on their way to the jail, defendant 
told him that "he was concerned—very concerned about them finding methamphetamine in 
his bedroom" R. 121: 19 (emphasis added). He also said that "all he had was a quarter 
gram" and he asked Sgt. Taylor "if [he] wouldn 't charge him for that because it was such 
a small amount" R. 121: 19 (emphasis addld). The magistrate, therefore, had before him 
defendant's admission that he possessed a quarter gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom. 
This was sufficient by itself to support a bindover. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229-30 
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(binding defendant over on forcible sodomy charges based only on defendant's admission 
that he committed two acts of sodomy with the victim, who was an employee, and officer's 
testimony that the victim appeared to be 14-years-old). 
The State, however, presented additional evidence supporting bindover. During the 
search of defendant's bedroom, Detective Rob Riding, a drug recognition expert, seized "a 
small baggy that contained a white crystal substance." R. 121: 36. Believing that the white 
crystal substance was contraband, he took the baggy to the police station where it was "field 
tested" for drugs. See R. 121: 36-38. The substance weighed just over one-half of a gram 
and tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 121: 36-38. This evidence, from a drug 
recognition expert, constituted a "plausible account" of guilt, Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 398,359 
N.W.2d at 155, and was thus '"sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing . . . that the [defendant] ha[d] committed . . . a[ ] [drug] offense,'" 
Trane, 2002 UT 97, at f 26 (quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37,99 S.Ct. at 2632). 
The magistrate, however, refused to bind defendant over because the controlled 
substance was still at the State Crime Lab pending more definitive testing. See R. 121: 40. 
The magistrate was concerned that the substance might ultimately test negative for 
methamphetamine. R. 121:40. When the prosecutor explained that the charge would simply 
be dismissed in that event, the magistrate held that "the law [does not] allow[ ] a grab bag" 
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. R. 121:40. In doing so, the magistrate "elevated 
the probable-cause standard to unrealistic heights." See Poole, 871 P.2d at 534 (search case). 
The magistrate in essence required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained, that is 
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not required. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 15. While it remained possible the substance was 
something other than methamphetamine, all the evidence suggested otherwise. By 
countenancing the possibility of a different result, the magistrate erroneously chose "an 
inference resulting in release of [ ] defendant when a reasonable alternative inference" 
supported the State's case. Dunn, 117 Wis.2d at 491,345 N.W.2d at 71. This was error. See 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, at f 10 (holding that the magistrate must draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the prosecution). 
In sum, it cannot be said that the evidence was "' wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference'" that defendant unlawfully possessed methamphetamine. See Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz, 660 P.2d at 729). Defendant admitted to having-
methamphetamine in his bedroom and police found a substance in his bedroom that field 
tested positive for methamphetamine. While more may be required to establish defendant's 
guilt at trial, i.e., State Crime Lab results, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient 
to support a "reasonable belief that defendant committed the offense. See Clark, 2001 UT 
9, at f 16. In short, the State's prosecution of the charge was not "groundless and 
improvident." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial 
court's order of dismissal and to remand the matter for trial. 
15 
Respectfully submitted this OO day of September, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEFFtfE 
/^ASSIST 
iY S. GRAY -
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of September, 2002,1 served two copies of the 
attached Brief of Appellant upon the defendant/appellee, Lance Peterson, by causing them 
to be delivered via first class mail, postage prepaid, to his counsel of record, as follows: 
Michael D. Esplin 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, UT 84606 
Jeffrey S. Gray * 
Assistant Attorney General 
16 
